Finality on Botanix EVM

The Botanix EVM inherits finality from Bitcoin's PoW. Finality, one of the biggest issues in traditional Layer 1 PoS blockchains is solved by building it on top of a PoW.

Let's dig deeper.

Bitcoin reaches finality by having a longest chain with the most computing power. This is the reason why people sometimes refer to Bitcoin as being "backed by energy".

By being inherently connected to Bitcoin, the Botanix EVM can inherit this finality. Other protocols that use Bitcoin's PoW for finality are Stacks and Babylon.

How does the Botanix EVM achieve Finality?

A Proof-of-Stake protocol needs to make sure that at a certain point a transaction becomes unchangeable. Traditional PoS chains implement different type of finality algorithms to achieve finality.

By the inherent connection with Bitcoin, Orchestrators will post the root hash of the current Botanix EVM Merkle Tree to Bitcoin. More precisely, every Bitcoin block, the current Orchestrator will inscript the Merkle Tree root hash on Bitcoin. See here more on inscriptions.

Inscriptions are a method where you can post arbitrary data to the Bitcoin blockchain. The Botanix EVM will use this to post the root hash. Once Bitcoin achieves finality, the root hash data is forever posted on Bitcoin. When this happens, the Botanix EVM by inheritance achieves finality. Transactions on the Botanix EVM from before this certain root hash are forever final.

Malicious Orchestrators posting the wrong Merkle Tree root hash

A malicious Orchestrator could post a single wrong Merkle Tree root hash to the Bitcoin blockchain. This will however be obvious to all other node runners:

Let's call the wrong root hash posted to Bitcoin in an OP_RETURN root hash A and the actual merkle root hash of the Botanix EVM block root hash B where root hash A =/= root hash B. As part of the PoS consensus, the Orchestrator communicates the currently built block, containing root hash B, to all the other stakers. All other stakers however also run Bitcoin and therefore witness the posting of root hash A. This means the malicious action is now exposed for all Orchestrators to see.

The posting of a wrong Merkle Tree root hash means the Botanix EVM does not achieve finality for this current Bitcoin block and is a slash-able action. The malicious Orchestrator will therefore get his stake slashed.

Malicious Orchestrators posting multiple Merkle Tree root hashes

A malicious Orchestrator could post a two different Merkle Tree root hashes to the Bitcoin blockchain: the correct one and a wrong one. This will however be obvious to all other node runners:

Let's call the wrong root hash posted root hash A and the actual Merkle Tree root hash of the Botanix EVM block root hash B where root hash A =/= root hash B. The malicious Orchestrator then posts both root hash A and root hash B to Bitcoin in two different OP_RETURNs.

As part of the PoS consensus, the Orchestrator communicates the currently built block, containing root hash B, to all the other stakers. All other stakers however also run Bitcoin and therefore also witness the wrong OP_RETURN posting of root hash A. This means the malicious action is now exposed for all Orchestrators to see.

The posting of a wrong merkle root is an unexpected and incorrect action for a Orchestrator and is a slashable action. The malicious Orchestrator will therefore get his stake slashed.